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THE METROPOLIS, HOME RULE, AND THE
SPECIAL DISTRICT
A Discussion of the Legal Validity of the Special District
Used in the Solution of Metropolitan Problems in California
PART TWO*

By

WAYNE

A. BRooKst

This is the second and concluding part of a discussion of the use of the
special district device in the solution of the metropolitan government problem in California. The first part pointed out the nature of the problem
which arises when a harmful physical condition spans many existing local
government boundaries. The independence of local government prevents
adequate handling of the matter since no one agency is competent to deal
with it throughout the metropolis. The need for solution of the air pollution
problem in the San Francisco Bay Area resulted in the creation by the State
Legislature of a special district spanning six counties. Since the California
Constitution provides for "Home Rule," the District presents serious constitutional issues. The first part of the discussion considered the problems
under section 6 of article XI dealing with the manner of creation and the
probable attitude of the California Supreme Court in light of the decision
in Santa Barbara etc. Agency v. All Persons." Discussion of the remaining
"Home Rule" provisions follows.
Legislative Interference With Local Government-

Sections 12 and 13 of Article XI
The preceding discussion was concerned with the question of creation
and the restrictions on the Legislature in the matter. There are other sections of article XI which restrict (or purport to restrict) the Legislature
from interfering specially with local government. Two of these sections
(sections 12 and 13) have usually been raised together by counsel seeking
to defeat a district, have been considered together by the Court, and have
appeared redundant to at least one writer who advocated repeal of section
* Editor's note: Part I of this article appeared in 11 HASTINGS L.J. 110 (November, 1959).

t B.A., St. Ambrose College; J.D., College of Law, State University of Iowa; LL.M.,
School of Law, Stanford University. Member, Iowa and California Bars. Assistant Professor
of Business Law, Fresno State College.
This article was prepared under the direction of Professor Gordon Scott of Stanford University, School of Law, without whose criticism, advice, and encouragement the task could not
have been completed.
87 47 Cal. 2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957).
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13.88 Due to the comprehensiveness of Mr. Peppin's discussion and criticism, no effort will be made to discuss all possible ramifications of these
sections. Rather the present discussion will be concerned with their application to the district device as used in the solution of metropolitan problems.
Section 12 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Legislature shall
have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities or other public or municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for
county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws,
vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect
taxes for such purposes.
Section 13 provides:
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private
corporation, company, association or individual any power to make, control,
appropriate, supervise or in any way interfere with any county, city, town
or municipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or assessments or perform any municipal function whatever, except that the Legislature shall have power to
provide for the supervision, regulation and conduct, in such a manner as it
may determine, of the affairs of irrigation districts, reclamation districts or
drainage districts, organized or existing under any law of this state.

Focus of Attention on "Municipal Purposes"
and eMunicipal Affairs"
While there are several interesting problems raised by this language,
the thrust of the court's approach to these sections when the invalidation of
a metropolitan district has been sought has been to the question of "municipal purposes" (section 12) or "municipal function" (section 13). Section
12 relates to the imposition of a tax for "municipal purposes" and section
13 purports to restrict the granting of power over "municipal functions"
to certain specified agencies, but the court seems to concentrate on "municipal" alone and appears to define that term restrictively to include only
those things which a city can do for itself. Since the metropolitan problem
cannot be dealt with by individual cities, measures for its solution appear
to be outside the scope of these sections under this approach.
In Santa Barbara, the opinion discussed only section 12, but the failure
to take up section 13 does not seem too meaningful. With respect to section
12 the opinion continued the traditional approach outlined above, and it
seems likely that if section 13 had been raised the same course would have
followed.

88

Peppin, Municipal Home Rue in California,34 CAT . L. REv. 644, 680, 689, 694, e.g.,
Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. $07, 169 Pac. 82 (1917).
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The Traditional ApproachThe "Larger Municipality" Doctrine
This approach has had quite a process of development in the cases. In
9 the court, in denying the petition for
In re Madera Irrigation District"
rehearing, stated that irrigation is not a "municipal purpose" within the
scope of organization of a city, and therefore there could be no conflict
between the District and a city which was within its boundaries." The contention had been made that the statute authorizing the District was unconstitutional because it permitted the District to tax property within the city.
The court said that the city was benefited and then found no conflict.
In 1914 in Pixley v. Saunders9 the court had to face the question of the
validity of a sanitary district which was operating inside a city as well as
in the surrounding unincorporated area when a taxpayer in the city objected
to payment of district taxes. The court adopted the opinion of the superior
court judge who held that in these circumstances sewage disposal was not a
"Imunicipal affair" and thus sections 12 and 13 were not violated. The District was formed in 1902 and was operating a sewer system for the area.
In 1908 the city was formed and the taxpayer now contended that sewers
were a municipal affair and that property within the city was relieved from
the control of the District. It was not, said the court, for the legislature
could provide for a single system for any territory which might be conveniently served. The opinion conceded that sanitation was something which
concerned cities, but found that the needs of an unified system were such
that it was no longer a municipal affair, but something more. Apparently,
metropolitan needs could furnish a basis for determining that sewage is
not a municipal affair.
In buttressing this conclusion the opinion discussed the circumstances
of another sanitary district in the same county.9 2 When this other District
was formed all the territory within its boundaries was unincorporated.
Later two cities were formed, one higher on the stream which provided an
outlet for sewage. The opinion indicated that if that District could not continue to operate a unified sewer system, the consequences would be horrendous. Each city would dump its sewage on the area below or have to
build a complete system through the lower area, and the unincorporated
area remaining would have to bear the full cost of the existing system.
There would be constant conflict, and so the conclusion was "inevitable"
that while sanitation is usually a "municipal affair," in many cases it cannot be handled by municipal authorities and, therefore, is not within sec89 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272 (1891). Discussed in Part I.
90 Id. at 341-42, 28 Pac. at 675-76.
91168 Cal. 152, 141 Pac. 815 (1914).
92

Id. at 159-60, 141 Pac. at 817-18.
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tions 12 and 13. Rather it is a public purpose like irrigation and reclamation with which the legislature can deal.
After this decision it would appear difficult to apply sections 12 and 13
to any District organized to deal with the metropolitan problem, and such
was the course of subsequent decisions. When Henshaw v. Foster93 arose
three years after Pixley, the court was able to dispose of the issue quickly.
After discussing the Pixley holding and quoting the sections, the court concluded that there was no violation because the District embraced the affairs of a "larger municipality" and the legislature was dealing with that
larger municipality. The court pointed out that the sections do not deal
exclusively with cities, but with all municipal corporations, of which the
District is one. 94 The "corporate authorities" of the District were not delegated any control over the "purely local affairs of the cities." The problem
was somewhat different from Pixley because in Henshaw the District was
created on top of existing cities, but the result was the same. When the
physical problem goes beyond city boundaries, it ceases to be a municipal
affair, purpose, or function although if the problem were internal it would
fall within that category and would supposedly be free from legislative
interference.
When the Metropolitan Water District for the Los Angeles area came
9 5 the issue
before the court in 1928 in City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain,
was easily settled by reference to Henshaw. However, a somewhat similar
issue was raised of interference with cities under the "municipal affairs"
portion of section 6, which purports to give charter cities exclusive control
of such "municipal affairs." It should be noted that while the term "affairs"
never appears in sections 12 and 13, the court in the cases discussed appears
to have equated that word with "purposes" and "functions." In any event
the court in disposing of the section 6 contention did not take quite the
same tack as it used in disposing of section 13. On the matter of section 13
the court took the position that the District was a "larger municipality"
which was within the section, not violative of it. As to section 6, however,
the court concluded that the District was not organized to supply water
within the constituent cities, but merely a joint effort to provide a supply
of water for city distribution." Ergo, as to the combined municipalities
the District was not engaging in a municipal affair, and there was no invasion of the cities' rights. 7 The holdings concerning sections 12 and 13
93 176 Cal. 507, 169 Pac. 82 (1917).

94 Id. at 512, 169 Pac. at 84.
95 204 Cal. 653, 269 Pac. 630 (1928).
61d. at 659-61, 269 Pac. at 633.
97
An interesting sidelight to this case occurred in 1933, when there was an attempt by
residents of Long Beach to withdraw from the District. The Supreme Court held that such
withdrawal had to take place in compliance with general law, not the city charter, since it was
not a municipal affair. Reidman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383, 18 P.2d 947 (1933).
9
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indicate that a district can operate within the city-that was the whole
argument in Pixley-but until the Pasadenacase the question of section 6
was not raised. Of course, in Pixley the city was not a charter city, but San
Diego, in Henshaw, was. Since both positions are presented in Pasadena,
it is somewhat surprising that the court did not simply rely on its section 13
reasoning to find no "municipal affair." Whether, the reasoning about section 6 constitutes a restriction of the section 13 concepts is speculative,
but it is submitted that the positions are somewhat inconsistent. As to the
Bay Area District, the section 13 concepts would suggest that the District
can validly operate within the cities and the counties, but the section 6
reasoning suggests that this might be an interference with "municipal affairs."9' 8 The effect of Santa Barbaraon this dichotomy is uncertain since
section 13 and the "municipal affairs" portion of section 6 were not considered in that decision. Actually, the Agency was like the Metropolitan Water
District in that it supplied water to its constituent units. Therefore, it is
possible that the Bay Area District can draw no comfort from Santa Barbara on this matter.

The "State Purpose" Doctrine
The formation of the multi-county Golden Gate Bridge and Highway
District to build the Golden Gate Bridge brought a somewhat different
approach to sections 12 and 13. In the cases just discussed the "larger municipality" character of the District was thought to be sufficient to avoid
sections 12 and 13. As to section 13 this position continued with respect
to the Bridge District in Doyle v. Jordan9 9 which decided in 1926 that formation could proceed, citing Henshaw to rebut a contention that section 13
was violated. In 1929 the court decided that the District was a "quasimunicipal" corporation in order to meet a claimed violation of the federal
constitutional provision prohibiting state impairment of contracts.' When
the Bridge District was formed, an action was commenced to test its validity so that bonds could be sold, and this action wound up as the 1931
decision in Golden Gate Bridge District v. Felt.10 1 Since Doyle v. Jordan
had settled the matter for section 13, the attack in 1931 centered on section 12. The directors of the District were selected by the county boards of
supervisors of member counties, and it was contended that these directors
98 There is interference because the city has power to regulate air pollution under its police
power, Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control, Municipalities and the Law in
Action, 1947 Ed. 424. If the District regulates the activities of people within the cities it must
interfere with the cities' regulation.
99 200 Cal. 170, 252 Pac. 577 (1926).
100 Wheatley v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 722, 279 Pac. 989 (1929).
101 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.2d 585 (1931). The case has been severely criticized by Peppin, supra
note 88, at 672-75.
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were not proper "corporate authorities" to whom the power to tax could be
given. One of the grounds for answering this contention was that section 12
was concerned with "municipal purposes" and that the District was for a
"state purpose" being part of the development of a highway system for the
state. 0 2 Perhaps the court felt that the state interest in highways was so
demonstrable that this District clearly would not be for "municipal purposes." Thus any difficulty with the "larger municipality" doctrine under
Pixley, Henskaw, and Pasadenawould be avoided. The construction was a
part of a state system, though being done locally. Thus the District was
designed to provide a local tax base, but not to solve a local problem 10 3
encompassed by the District. Thus it might be that there was no "larger
municipality" to which that doctrine could apply. There was, however, a
"state purpose," and the section deals with "municipal purposes" ergo no
violation and the Legislature could act as it saw fit with respect to the local
tax base for the District.
At this point it would appear that there were two doctrines usable to
avoid section 12. However, the court in the Bridge District case did not let
the matter stand on the "state purpose" doctrine, but proceeded to declare
that the 1929 decision that the District was a "quasi-municipal corporation" ("similar to a municipal water district, a public utility district, a
municipal utility district and a metropolitan water district..." 104) coupled
with this "state purpose" took the District out of section 12 and put it
within the rule that the Legislature can provide for taxation by appointive
boards. 10 1 Then followed a citation of Pixley, Henshaw, and Pasadena.
Since these cases had indicated that the fact that the District involved more
than one municipality would be enough to avoid the section, the combination of "quasi-municipal" and "state purpose" is confusing. Possibly, it
suggested that this "state purpose," i.e., a purpose which results from the
effect that the local activity has on some statewide activity (in the Bridge
Districtcase the state highway system), was an additional ingredient now
necessary to avoid the limitation of section 12. In any event, this reasoning
of the court made it certain that the purposes of this "quasi-municipal corporation" were "state" and not "municipal." This suggests that possibly
there were still two different doctrines, the use and application of which
would depend on the nature of the District as a "state agency" or a "larger
municipality."
While the preceding discussion about the existence of two doctrines is
02
Id. at 321, 5 P.2d at 591-92.
1 3A highway program for the whole state is a state problem, although the building of the
Golden Gate Bridge solved the local problem of getting from San Francisco to Marin County.
104 214 Cal at 321, 5 P.2d at 591-92.
105 Ibid.

1
0
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concerned with section 12, there is support for its application to section 13
in Joint Highway District No. 13 v. Hinman'0 6 (discussed infra) which
applied the "state purpose" doctrine to section 13. If this be true, then
County of Mariposa v. Merced IrrigationDistrict,"O7 decided in 1948, offered indication that both the "state purpose" and "larger municipality"
doctrines were serviceable. After the irrigation districts lost their tax exemption in Rock Creek, they apparently prevailed on the Legislature to
permit them to include non-contiguous property within their boundaries
so as to regain exemption.' The validity of this statute was the issue in
County of Mariposa and the court upheld the action of the Legislature.
One of the contentions advanced by counsel for the county was that this
statute gave the district directors power to affect county financial affairs
contrary to section 13. In answering this contention the court stated that
this was not interference-the effect on county taxation was incidental.""
Under article XIII, section 1, property acquired by "public agencies" becomes exempt when acquired according to the court (this is not true as to
property outside the boundaries of the "municipal corporation" but the
court did not consider this point), and the court concluded that:
On various grounds in analogous situations it has been held that such
transition does not constitute a violation of article XI, section 13, of the
Constitution."
The court followed with a citation of cases including Joint Highway District No. 13, Pasadena,Henshaw, and Doyle. It would appear that any and
all of these grounds in these cases were sufficient and section 13 should be
ignored in testing the validity of a district.
A similar conclusion with respect to section 12 is indicated by Santa
Barbara where the court stated that the limitations of section 12 do not
apply to "state purposes" (citing the Joint Highway District No. 13 case)
nor to a "larger municipality" (citing Henshaw and Pixley)."'
The "state purpose" doctrine was reinforced by the Joint Highway
District No. 13 case which was decided in 1934, referred to above. Here
the court simply declared that sections 12 and 13 were not violated. Section
12 was said to have no application, and the statute authorizing the formation of such districts was said not to do any of the things forbidden by
section 13, and not to give power "to trench upon any of the things mentioned in section 13 of article XI of the constitution relating to municipal
106 220 Cal. 578, 32 P.2d 144 (1934).
107 32 Cal. 2d 467, 196 P.2d 920 (1948).
108 See note 83 supra (Part I).

109 32 Cal. 2d at 475-76, 196 P.2d at 925.
0
"1 Id. at 476, 196 P.2d at 925.
11147 Cal 2d at 708, 306 P.2d at 883.
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affairs."" The authority for all this (there is no reasoning) was Petersen
v. Board of Supervisors, 3 decided by a district court of appeal in 1924.
The issue in the Petersen case was the validity of a reclamation district
which was entirely within a city. According to the court there was no interference with the city for the district was an arm of the state (a "state
agency") and therefore not a special commission, one of the bodies proscribed by section 13.1'4 Then the court concluded that section 12 was not
violated because reclamation is not a "municipal purpose" but a "state
purpose.""' 5 Next the court noted its prior conclusion with respect to section 13, and added a conclusion that the statute gives no power to interfere
"with any of the things mentioned in said section 13."' 6 According to the
court the District and the city were distinct and separate and their powers
did not conflict. Had the court been content to avoid section 13 on the
ground that this was a "state" and not a "municipal" purpose, the case
would merely represent another application of the "state agency" doctrine
long familiar in reclamation district cases." 7 But the declaration that the
District is not a special commission because it is an arm of the state, is
most remarkable. On this reasoning the Legislature could interfere with
municipal functions so long as the agency is a "state agency" regardless of
the type of agency set up, for such an agency could never be one of the forbidden bodies in section 13. If section 13 had any vitality after the "larger
municipality" doctrine, the endorsement of this reasoning by the court in
the Joint Highway DistrictNo. 13 case (if such was intended) would seem
to kill it.
The Status of the Bay Area District Under the
reState Purpose" and "Larger Municipality" Doctrines
There is one common feature running through these cases which might
suggest a different result for the Bay Area District. The Petersen, Bridge
District, and Joint Highway DistrictNo. 13 cases were concerned with a
112 220 Cal. at 588, 32 P.2d at 148.
113 65 Cal App. 670, 225 Pac. 28 (1924).

114 Id. at 674, 225 Pac. at 30.
115Id. at 677-78, 225 Pac. at 31. This may be the justification for the Joint Highway Dis-

trict No. 13 declaration in section 12.
116 Id. at 678, 225 Pac. at 31-32.
117E.g., People v Reclamation District No. 551, supra note 37 (Part I), and the cases discussed in the text following that note. The court in Petersen did allude to the power over
reclamation districts specifically given to the Legislature by amendment of section 13 in 1914.
This possibly would have furnished sufficient ground for taking the district out of the section,
but the court did not rely on the-amendment, declaring that if the district contravened the
prohibitory portion of section 13, the amendment could not save it. 65 Cal. App. at 678-79, 225
Pac. at 32. This caveat by the court throws the reasoning back to reliance on the "state agency"

doctrine.
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"state affair" or "state purpose" and if the localized form of organization
is ignored and attention is focused on the state activity involved, the approach adopted by the courts does not appear to be an undue interference
with "Home Rule." A similar focus of attention was used by the court in
Santa Barbara when it emphasized the vital interest of the state in water
problems citing article XIV, section 3 of the constitution." 8 If it would be
said that highway construction and water use are state problems, while air
pollution control is a local problem, then the "state purpose" doctrine
could not apply to the Bay Area District." 9 This would leave the "larger
municipality" doctrine and there is an interesting facet of the cases which
developed that doctrine which might suggest that it is inapplicable to the
Bay Area District. The court has emphasized in these cases that there is
no interference with the "affairs" or "purposes" of the cities by the Districts. In Pasadenathe court spent considerable effort showing that the
District served the cities, not the inhabitants. 2 Factually the same was
true of the Agency in Santa Barbara,though the court did not consider this
point. However, the Bay Area District must of necessity operate to control
the inhabitants of the Bay Area directly. Hence it is arguable that the
"larger municipality" doctrine does not apply to the Bay Area District
since that District must interfere with the cities in the Bay Area.
Taxing Power Under Section 12
This brings up another consideration under section 12. Even if the
"larger municipality" doctrine does apply to the Bay Area District, section 12 requires that the taxing power be given by general law and the Bay
Area District was created by special law. Thus its taxing power was given
by special law. If the District is a "larger municipality," then its purposes
would seem to be "municipal." Therefore, a general law would be required
to grant power to tax for such purposes, and the special law would violate
section 12. In Pixley, Henshaw, and Pasadenathe court specifically stated
118 47 Cal. 2d at 708, 306 P.2d at 881. Article XIV, section 3, as quoted by the court,
provides:
."because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which
they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised

with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and
for the public welfare..."....

119 Of course, air pollution control is a "state" problem in the sense that the growth of the
two largest metropolitan areas of the state as well as other areas is inevitably affected by air pollution. If this view is adopted, then sections 12 and 13 might as well be forgotten. Every problem
affecting people in the state would be a "state problem" and under the above discussion all
solutions would be within the competence of the Legislature. True, there would be no more
"Home Rule," but problems would be solved.

120 See text, supra following note 95.
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that the Legislature could do these things by general law,'' and in Pasadena the court devoted considerable attention to showing that the statute
was a general law."2 However, some difficulty arises when Santa Barbara
is considered on this point. There the statute was clearly special and the
question of a grant of tax power by special law was raised. In holding that
section 12 was not violated, the court emphasized the state's interest in
water problems and the contention of the Agency that it was for more than
a "'county, city, town, or other municipal purpose"' within section 1 2 .11"
This is, of course, the "state purpose" doctrine which would eliminate the
issue under section 12. However, the court also embraced the "larger
municipality" doctrine immediately before turning to the "state purpose"
discussion. Whether this signifies an application of the "state purpose"
thinking to the "larger municipality" doctrine is unclear. If it does not,
and the justification for the Santa Barbaraholding is the "state purpose"
involved, then the Bay Area District can draw no comfort from Santa Barbara, and may be in violation of the section 12 taxing power restriction.

e"CorPorate Authorities" Under Section 12
There is one other matter which might have caused difficulty under section 12-the manner of choosing the "corporate authorities." The Board
of Directors of the Bay Area District is not elected, 2 4 nor is there any
method provided for voter approval of the District. Under the Illinois view
of a provision similar to section 12, such voter approval is necessary. 25
However, after the Bridge District and Joint Highway District cases it
seems extremely doubtful that that is the California view. One of the
grounds in the Bridge District case was that the voters had approved the
121 Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. at 160, 141 Pac. at 818; Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. at 512,
169 Pac. at 84, City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. at 660, 269 Pac. at 633.
12 2
See text, supra following note 81.
M23
47 Cal. 2d at 708, 306 P.2d at 881. The reasoning of the court on this point is most
remarkable. After quoting from article XIV, section 3, supra note 118, and emphasizing the
"state purpose," the court concludes that the Agency does not violate section 12, giving as an
additional reason the fact that no case had been found to the contrary. Actually the problem has
not been dealt with since Bridge District and Joint Highway DistrictNo. 13 involved general
laws although the court did not mention the fact in those cases. In Bridge District the court
held that the curative acts were not special legislation though as a matter of fact they could
apply to only one district. 214 Cal. at 323, 5 P.2d at 592. If the matter is one of first impression
in Santa Barbara, the fact that no other cases have been found against the court's position
should not serve as a reason for the position. On that basis nothing could ever be unconstitutional.
The members of the Board are appointed by the city councils and county boards of
supervisors.
125 Peppm, supra note 88, at 669. In succeeding pages of the article the other view which
has been adopted in West Virginia, South Carolina, and Colorado is stated. This view apparently finds no difficulty in vesting taxing power in appointed officials, assent or no.
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bonds of the District and the ordinances leading to its formation.'2 6 While
this might cast doubt on the idea that no voter approval is necessary, the
Joint Higkway District case involved no form of voter approval, and the
court specifically stated that the directors could be appointed without violating section 12.127 These cases have been criticized as based on unsound
reasoning,'28 but it is submitted that the issue is not so important if the
general law doctrine be kept intact. It appears doubtful that the Legislature
could create a District by special law and then give the taxing power in a
general law. To say that such a taxing law is general would strain all meaning out of that word. Since general law requires local activity to produce
formation, local consent and participation would be assured, even if the
directors were appointed rather than elected. Further, it should be noted
that the appointment of the Bay Area District Directors is done by locally
elected officials. In this instance the local interests are protected to a degree, though not as fully as if direct election were the method.
There are more basic objections to the court's approach to sections 12
and 13, than the criticism of the view of "corporate authorities." If these
sections are conceived as being designed to protect "Home Rule" and independence of local government, the court's approach, whether it be based on
the "larger municipality" doctrine or the "state purpose" doctrine, clearly
defeats these designs. In so far as the metropolitan problem is concerned,
the approaches recognize a greater need for solution of the immediate physical difficulty, be it water supply or disposal or air pollution or any other
social evil, and ignore the conflicts which make the physical problem into
a symptom of the metropolitan problem. For sections 12 and 13 there is
simply no metropolitan problem' 29 under these approaches, especially if
Santa Barbarais to be applied literally. The printer might as well leave
them out of the next printing of the constitution.
Grant of Police Power-Section II of Article XI
There is one more "Home Rule" provision which should be dealt with
-section 11 of article XI, which provides:
Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits
all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws.
126 214 Cal. at 320, 5 P.2d at 591.
127 220 Cal. at 588, 32 P.2d at 148.

128 Peppin, supra note 101, at 672-75.
129 In County of Los Angeles v. Hunt, 198 Cal. 753, 774, 247 Pac. 897, 905 (1926), the

court in upholding an "acquisition and improvement" district stated:
... when a general law of the state provides, as the act in question does, for a scheme
of public improvement, the scope of which both intrudes upon and transcends the
boundary of one or several municipalities, such contemplated improvement ceases to be
a municipal affair and comes within the proper domain and regulation of the general
laws of the state.
Once the metropolitan problem arises and the state untertakes to deal with it, "Home Rule"
considerations are out the window.
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On the surface, this provision would appear merely to extend these powers
to the specified local governments, and not to restrict the Legislature in
vesting such powers in other forms of local government. However, such
does not appear to be the case, for two reasons. One reason is the attitude
of the Supreme Court in In re Werner'30 and Gilgert v. Stockton Port District,'13 and the other is the provision of article IV, section 1 which vests
the legislative power of the state in the Legislature. 3 2 The holdings of the
Werner and Gilgert cases are that sanitary and port districts cannot pass
criminal ordinances. The basis for these holdings is that section 11 gives
the police power only to the enumerated local governments. Narrowly limited to exercise of police power by declaring conduct to be criminal, these
cases would not, perhaps, restrict the Legislature in granting authority to
exercise police power by proscribing conduct and using the normally civil
process of injunctive enforcement. Since the method of enforcement to be
used by the Bay Area District is the injunctive process, 83 the application
of these cases on a narrow or a broad basis might be determinative of the
constitutional validity of the District under section 11. The opinions are
somewhat confusing on this point for there is language tending both ways.
In Werner, decided in 1900, the issue arose under an amendatory statute
which purported to give sanitary districts power to determine the qualifications of persons authorized to sell liquor and approve licenses for the
sale of liquor within the District. The District there involved passed an
ordinance making it a misdemeanor to sell liquor without a district license.
The petitioner possessed a license from the county but refused to comply
with the District's ordinance, was convicted, and jailed. He then sought
habeas corpus alleging the statute and ordinance to be unconstitutional.
On two grounds the court held so. The first ground was that there was more
than one subject in the title to the statute, 13 4 but the second ground was
that the Legislature could not give this power to a sanitary district. The
District was not a municipality for according to the court that term is limited to cities. Then the court applied the maxim inclusio unius est excluio
alteriusto section 11, and concluded that the Legislature had no authority
to:
create other public corporate bodies-whether called districts or by any
...
other names-and clothe them with the power to make and enforce local,
130 129 Cal. 567, 62 Pac. 97 (1900).
1317 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P.2d 847 (1936).
132 "The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly which shall
be designated 'The Legislature of the State of California'.... " The Section then proceeds to
reserve certain power to the people.
133 CAL.HEALTH & SArETY CODE §§ 24360.7, 24357.11.
184 Contrary to article IV, section 24. 129 Cal. at 572, 62 Pac. at 99.
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police, sanitary, and other regulations conferred by the constitution on
counties, cities, towns, or townships. 13
In a concurring opinion Justice McFarland stated that he was of the opinion
that the Legislature could not, under any circumstances delegate to a sanitary district the power of enacting penal legislation. He felt that that power
must be confined to the municipalities mentioned in the constitution, for
the constitution
"does not contemplate that the state should be overrun and overloaded
with innumerable legislative bodies, each having power to make laws under
which citizens may be sent to jail." 136
The majority opinion was broader in scope, apparently denying to districts
all power granted by section 11, but the concurring opinion emphasized the
narrow restriction to penal legislation. Since the case was concerned with a
penal ordinance, this might be all that the case stands for.
When the Gilgert case came up in 1936, the court had Werner to rely
on and the result in Gilgert followed naturally. Again, however, the opinion
is somewhat confusing as to the basis for decision. The ordinance of the
Port District which zoned property within the District was passed under
provisions of the enabling statute which gave authority to plan the harbor,
enact necessary police regulations, and prescribe fines, forfeitures, and
penalties for violation of any ordinance. Gilgert was adversely affected by
the zoning ordinance and sought to restrain its enforcement. The holding
was that the statute and the ordinance were invalid. In the opinion appear
both the above quotations from Werner; a quotation from Cooley on ConstitutionalLimitations to the effect that the Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make laws;' citations to cases holding that the Board of Harbor
Commissioners of Eureka, the Board of Viticultural Commissioners, and
the Board of Medical Examiners could not declare what acts constituted
a misdemeanor; 138 and a statement that for the purpose of local legislation
certain functions could be conferred on political subdivisions; but the court
could not believe that the people or the Legislature intended to bestow on
such agencies the power to declare penalties. 39 There is no clue to determine whether this collection of authority and belief is intended to convey
the idea that the restriction that the court found in section IIis only against
the grant of police power to other agencies than those specified by section
11. If their narrow holding is all the cases stand for, then the second reason
135 129 Cal. at 574, 62 Pac. at 100.
186 129 Cal. at 575, 62 Pac. at 100.
37
1
At 163 (7th ed. 1903), Vol. I,at 224 (8th ed. 1927).
138 Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 26 Pac. 375
(1891); Ex parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21 (1883); Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 Pac. 237 (1888).
139 7 Cal. 2d at 388-91, 60 P.2d at 849-50.
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for doubt under section 11 (based on section 1, of article IV) comes into
play. (It is fair to say that this second reason is coterminous with a broader
interpretation of Werner and Gilgert.) Since the legislative power is vested
in the Legislature, since legislative power is not delegated, and since section 11 represents the grant of legislative authority to local government, 140
it would appear that no form of local government other than those specified
could have legislative power. This would eliminate the exercise of police
power by districts regardless of the form of sanction, for it is clear from
Werner and Gilgert that section 11 is limited in scope to the specified local
governments.

The Police Power Vested in the Bay Area District
As to the Bay Area District, the above conclusion forces an examination of the power involved-what is it and who exercises it? If control of
air pollution is an exercise of the police power, and that power is held by
the District, the statute would appear to be unconstitutional. On the other
hand, if the police power is exercised directly by the Legislature, and the
Bay Area District is only a local administrative agency, another set of
questions is raised.
That control of air pollution is an exercise of the police power seems
manifest under Freund's definition of that power:
[I] t aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare, and it does so
1 41
by restraint and compulsion.
The California Supreme Court has said of the police power:
[I] t is apparent that the police power is not a circumscribed prerogative,

but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief
in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of expanding
to meet existing conditions of modern life and thereby keep pace with the
1
social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the human race. '
Therefore it seems clear that in controlling air pollution somebody is using
the police power whether the ultimate enforcement be made to depend on
injunctive relief or criminal penalties. If more support for this position
were needed the example of zoning should suffice. It must be conceded that
zoning is an exercise of the police power. 48 It is equally certain that zoning
regulations can be enforced by the injunctive process. This is true whether
the ordinance provides another penalty,'

or gives no sanctions at all.1 45

140 This seems clear from the Gilgert v. Stockton Port District opinion, supra, note 131.
141 FRaEui, TmE POLICE POWER 3 (1904).
4
1 2 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 Pac. 481, 483 (1925).
' 43 Ibid; YoxLEY, ZomwG LAW An PRAcncE 17-21 (2nd ed. 1953).
144 Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal. App. 2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (1948).
145 City of Stockton v. Frisbie and Latta, 93 Cal. App. 277, 199 Pac. 270 (1929).
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It would seem to follow that existence and use of the police power does not
depend on the sanction. Indeed, the considerations which bothered the
court in Werner and Gilgert apply to injunctive enforcement since the ultimate threat is imprisonment for contempt. Under the statute the court does
not appear to have any more discretion in issuing an injunction than it
would in imposing penal sanctions once a violation has been found.148

Who Exercises the Police Power?
This brings up the second question-who exercises the power, the state
or the district? The statute is most confusing on this point, perhaps, designedly so. The statute proscribes the discharge of air contaminants which
cause:
... injury, detriment, nuisance or annoyance to any considerable number of
persons or to the public or which endanger the comfort, repose, health or
a natural
safety of any such persons or the public or which cause or have
tendency to cause injury or damage to business or property. 147

Then follows a provision that any violation:
... of this article [containing the above proscription] or of any order, rule,
or regulation of the board may be enjoined in a48 civil action brought in the
name of the people of the State of California.1
The statute goes on to provide a method for the framing of these orders,
rules, and regulations and an administrative procedure for determining
violations and ordering correction.149 If this process fails the hearing board

is to certify the facts to the district attorney of the county in which the
violation occurs. The district attorney then "shall" petition the superior
court for an injunction. 10 At this point it would appear that the injunction
is to enforce either the statute or the orders, rules, or regulations of the
District, or both. And this conclusion would suggest that the District is
making regulations within section 11. But the statute then throws more
confusion into the matter when it provides:
The court shall receive in evidence any order, rule or regulation of the
board, any transcript of the proceedings before the hearing board, and such
further evidence as the court in its discretion deems proper. 151
146 CAL. HEALTH & SAFEay CODE § 24367.11 requires the court to issue a show-cause order.
Thereafter the proceedings are to proceed as with any other injunction. While the court would
still be able to refuse an injunction if no violation were shown, the statutory language appears
to leave little room for doubt about the course of the action if the violation is shown.
1 47

CAL. HEALTH & SA-ETY CODE § 24360.

148 CAL. HEALTH & SAaETY CODE § 24360.7.

149 CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE §§ 24362-24367.9.
150 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24367.11.

151 Ibid.
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There are two possibilities as to what this provision means: (1) The evidence is received to show the state of the law as declared by the District;
(2) the evidence is received to show the violation of the statute as it has
been administratively interpreted by the District. Under the first possibility, the District would exercise police power; under the second, the state
would do so. And if it were determined that the District was exercising
police power, this exercise would be contrary to section 11. However, such
a holding would not necessarily deprive the District of its status as an
administrative body, enforcing state law. 5 2 Thus whichever possibility
becomes the interpretation of the evidence provision, the issue of state
exercise of police power within a local area must be dealt with.
There are several instances in the cases which have been discussed before in which the court has held that the state could operate on a local basis
-that is the foundation of the "state agency" and "state purpose" doctrines. It would appear from the cases that the state can authorize local
districts to carry on drainage, reclamation, irrigation, and highway and
bridge construction. However, there is something a little different about
these projects. The court made reference to a "state system" being involved,
and the implication is that this is more than an interest in seeing to it that
local problems are adequately dealt with. Certainly, substandard conditions
in one part of the state may have an influence on the whole of the state,
but recognition of the influence is a different matter from recognition of the
local condition as a part of a statewide condition demanding a state system
for handling the solution. Thus local street improvement may be something
in which the state is interested, but, except as the street forms an integral
part of a state network of roads, the local streets are probably not part of
the "state system." The scheme of water pollution control adopted in California is based on a state system, though most of its activity takes place
on a regional level which might be denominated local. 5 s However, air
pollution control affects local areas primarily and so the scheme is different
-no state system, but a local district enforcing state law.
152 A question might be raised that the District is an administrative agency acting judicially.
However, this point should not cause serious trouble since the hearing board of the District is
presumably local within the long line of authority that such agencies even exercising "judicial
functions" are not within the barred category. Irvine v. Citrus Pest District, 62 Cal. App. 2d
378, 144 P.2d 857 (1944), and cases cited therein.
153 Created: Stats. 1949, ch. 1549, p. 2782, appears as: CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13064.
The agency consists of state and regional boards, one of which is created for the Bay Area.
CAL. WATER CODE §13040(b). The regional boards have authority to investigate pollution and
prescribe requirements for waste disposal. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13053-13055. It can hold hearings concerning violations, order corrections, and seek injunctive enforcement of its orders. CAL.
WATER CoDE §§ 1306-13064. If the regional board fails to act, the state board can do so and
has the powers of the regional board for this purpose. CAL. WATER CODE § 13025.
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Legislative Exercise of the State's Police Power in Local
Affairs-Equal Protection
At first glance it is a little shocking to find the Legislature legislating
for one local area alone and providing local machinery for enforcement.
Aside from any feelings about "Home Rule" and independence of local
governments, it seems somehow improper to operate in this fashion. However, apparently no objection can be founded on the equal protection clause
of the 14th amendment to the federal constitution. In 1954 in Salsburg v.
Maryland'" the United States Supreme Court held that a state could discriminate between areas within the state, declaring that equal protection
applies to persons and not to areas and does not require territorial uniformity."' The case involved a statute in Maryland permitting the introduction
of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure in prosecution for
gaming in only one county. In the rest of the state the evidence was inadmissible. The Court recognized the statute as an exercise of the police power
and found it constitutional. As a further basis for constitutionality beyond
the persons-not area declaration the opinion relied on reasonableness of
classification-another facet of the equal protection issue.'56 While the use
of this basis has received law review criticism as irrelevant, 15 7 it only serves
to re-enforce the conclusion that the state may regulate where it pleases
within its boundaries, for even if equal protection applied between areas,
it would appear easy to find reasonable classification on the area basis. As
far as the Bay Area District is concerned, the legislative history 5 s and the
declaration of policy in the statute'59 show the existence of a special problem for a special area requiring special solution which should be sufficient
for reasonableness of classification.
There is some evidence that California would take a similar position on
the persons-not area application of equal protection. While there is no
statement from the Supreme Court, two district court of appeal opinions
quote favorably from an opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
to the effect that:
The equality of the constitution is the equality of persons, and not of places,
-the equality of right, and not of enjoyment. '6
154 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Mr. justice Douglas dissented on the ground that evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure should never be admitted.
155 Id. at 551.
156 Id. at 553.
157 Comment, 12 WAsH. &LEE L. REv. 99 (1955).

158 E.g., Air Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, Report of the Joint Subcommittee
on Air Pollution of the Assembly Interim Committees on Conservation, Planning and Public
Works pp. 24-41, Feb., 1955.
1 59
CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE §§ 24346-24346.2.
160

In re Marincovich, 48 Cal. App. 474, 482, 192 Pac. 156, 159 (1920) ; In re Makings,
78 Cal. App. 58, 61, 247 Pac. 923, 924 (1926) ; quoting from State v. Dow, 70 N.H. 286, 47 Adt.
734 (1900).
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However, while the language seems clear enough, the context of the cases
is such that it is difficult to tell if this was holding or dicta. The cases arose
under legislation enacted pursuant to section 25/ 2 of article IV which
authorized the Legislature to divide the state into fish and game districts
and enact such laws as seem appropriate for the respective districts. The
cases came up on habeas corpus from convictions of violations of statutes
161
applicable to one or a group but not all districts. In In re MarincoviclZ
the above language was quoted to show that there was no discrimination in
the manner in which the people were granting rights to use their property,
and this would appear to be a holding on the point. However, in In re Makings" ' the district court of appeal answered the petitioner's contentions in
part with the quotation, but said that it was unclear to the court how the
contentions bore on the statute. The court apparently felt, quoting from
an opinion of the Supreme Court,163 that the statute was concerned with
granting a qualified property right in property of the people which could
be done on such conditions as the Legislature saw fit to impose. The petitioner then sought habeas corpus from the Supreme Court, but fared no
better. " " The court held that under section 25Y2 the Legislature had full
power to deal locally with whatever problems arose. The court did reject
a case from Arkansas and one from South Carolina which had held that
discrimination on a geographic basis was bad, but the ground was that those
.states did not have a section like section 252. This does not overturn
Marincovich or the district court of appeal Makings opinion, but it certainly does not support those cases. However, in light of the Salsburg case,
the federal constitution, and the district court of appeal opinions, it would
be reasonable for the California Supreme Court to adopt the persons-not
area doctrine.
Even if the court would not accept the doctrine, the action of the Legislature in regulating the Bay Area would not be invalid if founded on reasonable classification. The court has stated that equal protection is not violated:
... if the classification of persons or things is based on some difference in
the classes having a substantial relation to the purpose for which the legislation was designed. 166
The court has upheld a statute requiring a hearing before discharge of probationary teachers in large school districts, although no hearing was required for small school districts, on the ground that there was reason for
161 In re Marmcovich, supra note 160.
162Ibid.
1 63
Ex parte Kenneke, 136 Cal. 527, 60 Pac. 261, 78 Cal. App. at 61, 247 Pac. at 924.
164In re Makings, 200 Cal. 474, 253 Pac. 918 (1927).
1
65 Sacramento M.U. District v. P.G.&E. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 693, 128 P.2d 529, 535 (1942).
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the classification. 16' Thus it should be possible for the court to find sufficient
reason in the classification of the Bay Area as requiring special attention.

Conflict Between Local and State Police Power
If it be assumed that the Legislature can exercise the state's police
power for a local area, there is another question raised. Can a city or county
pass an ordinance permitting the activities forbidden by the Legislature?
It seems apparent that the regulation of air pollution is within the power
of cities and counties under section 11. That section only restricts the local
governments when there is a general law on the subject. Whatever may be
said about the difficulty of distinguishing between general and special laws
in some cases, the Bay Area District statute seems clearly to be a special
law. Thus it would appear that within their boundaries, cities and counties
could do as they pleased and pass hamstringing ordinances which could
defeat the Bay Area District. Further, if the state could give police power
to the District, this same course of action would appear to be open to the
counties and cities for the enactments of the District certainly would not
be general law. Any successful action by a city or county along these lines
would mean the end of the District as a device for metropolitan government, for it would represent the reassertion of "Home Rule" and independence of local action which creates the metropolitan problem. On the
other hand, successful regulation by the District or by the state for the Bay
Area alone, which the cities and counties are unable to contravene, means
the practical end of "Home Rule," though it solves the metropolitan problems by obliterating it.

Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this Article to raise the issues presented by
the application of the provisions of the California Constitution apparently
designed to protect "Home Rule" to the Bay Area Air Pollution Control
District, used as an example of the district as a device for metropolitan
government. The metropolitan problem is undeniably real. If it did not
exist the Bay Area District would not have been created, nor would any
of the municipal and metropolitan water and utility districts have been
formed. But the very existence of the problem of metropolitan government
presents the reasons against the validity of the device proposed for its solution. In so far as there are constitutional guarantees designed to protect
the rights of citizens to determine the geographical extent and the power
of their local government, there are barriers to metropolitan government.
If the guarantees are removed by judicial decision upholding the validity
of a device such as the Bay Area District, and it is submitted that they
must be removed if the Bay Area District is to be upheld, the Legislature
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could do as it pleased with local government. If the Legislature can by special law create a local public agency with power to tax and to regulate the
activities of the inhabitants of the locality with respect to air pollution, or
to administer state regulation applicable only to the locality, without interference by the cities and counties, then it should be able to deal specially
with any problem which is metropolitan in extent and with the metropolitan
problem itself.
In 1957 the Legislature created the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District.8 7 The statute in its policy section states that it is in furtherance of state policy to stimulate the maximum use of the harbor in San
Francisco Bay.les Whether this is an attempt to declare the District to be
a "state agency" for "state purposes" within the pronouncements of the
Santa Barbara decision is not certain, but the Attorney General is convinced that the District is a function of the state government."" What has
been said about Santa Barbarawould suggest that this Rapid Transit District should have no trouble clearing the constitutional hurdles of sections
6, 12 and 13 if the declaration of policy is accepted at face value and Santa
Barbarais not restricted to water problems. Since the District has no regulatory functions, the objections to the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District based on section 11 would not apply, and that section should pose no
difficulties for the Rapid Transit District.
Further, proposals are current for Bay Area zoning. While this is probably a clearer interference with cities and counties since they are active in
the field, the present writer is unable to see any difference between this type
of regulation and the regulation of air pollution on a qualitative basis. So,
if the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District is valid, there should be no
constitutional objection to a Bay Area Zoning District. The next step would
be to create a multi-function district to handle all these problems. While it
would have a greater range of power, there would be no qualitative difference. This solves the metropolitan problem-so long as population does not
spread beyond the boundaries of the district-but it destroys "Home Rule"
and the independence of local government.
Solution of the dilemma posed by the metropolitan problem--conflict
between the need for regional handling of regional problems and the desire
for the preservation of the powers and prerogatives of sub-regional groupings of population and government in cities and counties--demands a care166 Kennan v. S. F. Unified School District, 32 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382 (1950).
167 CAL. PuBiac UTIaEs CODE §§28500-29750. A statute permitting formation has been
on the books since 1949. Stats. 1949, ch. 1239, p. 2173. In 1951 a Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission was set up to do further study. Stats. 1951, ch. 1760, p. 4187. These studies resulted in

the first listed statute.
108 CAL. PUBrC UTIIT S CODE § 28501.
169 30 OPs. CAL. Ar'y. GEN. 184 (1957).
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ful evaluation of the possible dangers from failure to deal with the physical
cause of the particular physical cause of the particular physical problem
and the dangers of a too successful solution for the governmental structure.
Perhaps a total reevaluation of the scheme of local government is in order
to redetermine the roles to be played by city, county, and regional government with relation to the state. However, since "Home Rule" was embodied
in the Constitution of California, this reevaluation is more properly the
province of the amendatory process, than the province of the court in ruling on the validity of a particular device. There is no question of the seriousness of the physical problems and the need for their solution, but so
long as the court is able to avoid the Constitution as it did in Santa Barbara
and some of its predecessors, the focus of attention will not be on the governmental problems but on the physical problems. If and when the governmental problems are faced, the precedent of Santa Barbarawill be at least
somewhat of a barrier to a reassertion of "Home Rule." Should the Bay
Area Air Pollution Control District be found valid by the court, it is submitted that "Home Rule" might as well be forgotten about. This may be
as it should be in the light of the problems that have arisen, but it is strongly
submitted that the choice should lie, not with the court, but with the people.

